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Abstract
Despite linear programming and duality have correctly been incorporated in algorithms
to compute the nucleolus, we have found mistakes in how these have been used in a broad
range of applications. Overlooking the fact that a linear program can have multiple op-
timal solutions and neglecting the relevance of duality appear to be crucial sources of
mistakes in computing the nucleolus. We discuss these issues and illustrate them in mis-
taken examples collected from a variety of literature sources. The purpose of this note
is to prevent these mistakes propagate longer by clarifying how linear programming and
duality can be correctly used for computing the nucleolus.
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1 Introduction
One of the main solution concepts in cooperative game theory is the nucleolus, proposed by
Schmeidler (1969). A number of approaches have been developed in order to compute it,
as reviewed by Leng and Parlar (2010) and Cetiner (2013). Although linear programming
and duality have been correctly used in several approaches (e.g. Fromen (1997); Hallefjord
et al. (1995); Kimms and Cetiner (2012)), we have found that the nucleolus has been
wrongly computed over the years in a wide variety of contexts. The mistakes appear to
be caused by overlooking the possibility that a linear program can have multiple solutions,
and by neglecting the use of the dual solution as a valuable source of information in such
cases. In this note, we discuss these issues and illustrate them in six examples taken from a
variety of literature sources. The examples correspond to applications of cooperative game
theory in insurances (Lemaire, 1991), joint development of projects (Krus and Bronisz,
2000), production and transportation planning (Sakawa et al., 2001), electricity markets
(SatyaRamesh and Radhakrishna, 2009), mobiles in broadcast transmission (Hasan et al.,
2011), and manufacturing (Oh and Shin, 2012). It came to our attention that similar
errors have appeared in such a wide range of applications. Our purpose in this note
is to clarify how linear programming and duality can be used to correctly calculate the
nucleolus, thus to prevent an even larger propagation of these errors.
2 Cooperative games and linear programming
Let N = f1; : : : ; ng be the set of players and K the set of all non-empty subsets of N . The
characteristic function v : K ! R assigns to each coalition S in K the cost of coalition
S. A preimputation or cost allocation vector x = (x1; : : : ; xn) assigns to each player j in
N a quantity xj such that
P
j2N xj = v(N); that is, the cost of the grand coalition N is
split among its members according to the allocation x (xj 2 R 8j 2 N). An allocation
vector x satises rationality if
P
j2S xj  v(S) 8S 2 K. The core of the game is the set
of preimputations that satisfy the rationality conditions.
Dene the excess of coalition S at x as "(x; S) = v(S)   Pj2S xj. The excess is a
measure of how satised a coalition S is with the cost allocation x. The larger the
excess of S, the more satised coalition S is. Dene the excess vector at x as e(x) =
("(x; S1); : : : ; "(x; Sm)), where the sets Si represent the coalitions in KnN andm = 2n 2.
For an excess vector e 2 Rm, dene a mapping  such that (e) = y, where y 2 Rm is
the vector which results from arranging the components of e in a non-decreasing order.
A vector y = (y1; : : : ; ym) is said to be lexicographically greater than another vector
y = (y1; : : : ; ym) if either y = y or there exists h 2 f1; : : : ;mg such that yh > yh and
yi = yi 8i < h (if h = 1, it is enough that yh > yh). We annotate y  y.
Note in some contexts the characteristic function v is dened as a benet instead of cost
and the excess as a measure of dissatisfaction instead of satisfaction. Both perspectives
can be approached in equivalent ways. We rather adopt the cost perspective, since most of
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the recent interest for cooperative games in Operations Research comes from cost sharing
problems in collaborative logistics. Also, our attention focus in games with a non-empty
core. A main question in these games is how the players should share the cost v(N) when
collaborating in the grand coalition N . The nucleolus is one of the most used solution
concepts for this problem. The prenucleolus is a related concept which for games with
non-empty core coincide with the nucleolus.
2.1 The prenucleolus
The prenucleolus of a game with non-empty core is the preimputation x which lexico-
graphically maximizes the excess vector, that is, (e(x))  (e(x)) for all preimputation
x. In order to compute the prenucleolus, let us rst consider the following linear pro-
gramming model, which looks for a preimputation x = (x1; : : : ; xn) that maximizes the
minimum excess " among all the coalitions.
max " (1)
s.t. "+
X
j2S
xj  v(S) 8S  N;S 6= ; (2)X
j2N
xj = v(N) (3)
" 2 R; xj 2 R 8j 2 N (4)
Objective function (1) maximizes ". Constraints (2) impose that such " cannot be
greater than the excess of any coalition. Thus, (1) and (2) together provide that " is
exactly equal to the minimum excess. Constraint (3) is the eciency condition, which
provides that the the cost of the grand coalition v(N) is split among its players according
to the allocation x. Constraints (4) state the nature of the variables. We refer to this
model simply as P .
The solution to P is not necessarily unique. As we will illustrate in the numerical
examples, it may occur that more than one allocation x leads to the optimal objective
value. In addition, a solution of P provides an allocation that maximizes the lowest excess,
but not necessarily the second or any subsequent lowest excess.
The prenucleolus can be found by solving a sequence of linear programs (LPs), as
in the algorithm by Fromen (1997) which we briey outline below. The rst LP in the
sequence corresponds to P . Let "1 be the optimal objective value of P . The k-th LP
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(k > 1) in the sequence is formulated as follows:
max "k (5)
s.t. "k +
X
j2S
xj  v(S) 8S  N : S =2 Fk (6)
"i +
X
j2S
xj = v(S) 8S 2 Fi; i 2 f1; : : : ; k   1g (7)X
j2N
xj = v(N) (8)
"k 2 R; xj 2 R 8j 2 N (9)
In this k-th LP, objective function (5) and constraints (6) provide that the k-th min-
imum excess "k is maximized. Constraints (7) state that the excess of the coalitions con-
tained in set Fi must be equal to the optimal objective value "i to the i-th LP. Constraints
(8) and (9) state conditions for the eciency and nature of the variables, respectively.
The set Fi is the set of all coalitions for which the excess constraint (6) is satised with
equality sign for all the solutions to the i-th LP. Thus, the excess of the coalitions in Fi
must be xed to "i in the k-th LP in the series for all k > i, as expressed in constraint (7).
The set Fk is simply the union of all the coalitions for which its excess has been xed in a
previous LP in the sequence, that is, Fk =
S
i<k Fi. Note by dening F1 = ; and omitting
constraints (7) for k = 1, one recovers the rst problem P in the sequence. A key issue is
how to nd the set Fi, and here is where dual linear programming plays a relevant role.
The dual of P , which we will refer as model D, can be formulated as follows:
max
X
S2K
v(S)  yS (10)
s.t.
X
S2KnN
yS = 1 (11)X
S2K:j2S
yS = 0 8j 2 N (12)
yS  0 8S 2 K nN; yN 2 R (13)
From duality theory, when the optimal value of a dual variable is positive, the inequal-
ity constraint associated to this variable must hold with equality at any optimal solution
of P . Therefore, given a solution to P the set F1 can be formed by all the coalitions S
for which yS is positive in the corresponding solution to D. Analogously, for a general k,
the set Fk can be formed by all the coalitions such that the dual variable associated to
constraint (6) is positive in the corresponding optimal solution to the dual problem of the
k-th LP in the sequence. In order to nd the prenucleolus, the solution process proceeds
until a k where the LP has a unique solution. At the latest, such unique solution will be
obtained when constraints (7) and (8) dene a system of n independent linear equations.
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2.2 The nucleolus
Dene the setX by all the allocation vectors which satisfy the eciency condition and also
the individual rationality constraint xj  v(fjg) 8j 2 N . The nucleolus is an allocation
vector x 2 X whose excess vector is lexicographically greatest, that is, (e(x))  (e(x))
for all x 2 X. Incorporating the individual rationality constraint in the LPs dened in
Section 2.1, conduces to the nucleolus. The corresponding dual problem is formulated
similarly as problem D, but needs to add a decision variable yj  0 associated to the
rationality condition for all j 2 N . Consequently, the term Pj2N v(fjg)  yfjg must be
added in objective function (10), and also yj must be added in the left-hand side of
constraint (12) for all j 2 N . The nucleolus can be found by solving the corresponding
sequence of LP in analogous way as for the prenucleolus. Schmeidler (1969) proves that
the nucleolus consists of a single point. As we focus in games with non-empty core, the
nucleolus and the prenucleolus coincide. (In other type of games, these concepts may be
dened as a set instead of a unique point.)
3 Numerical examples
In this section we present six examples taken from a variety of contexts in the literature,
where the nucleolus has been wrongly calculated. We identify two main sources of error.
First, overlooking the fact that the solution to model P is not unique. Second, given that
a particular solution to the i-th LP in the sequence, the set Fi has been wrongly computed
as the set of all coalitions whose excess is equal to "i at such particular solution.
We use the notation v^(S) for referring to the characteristic function of games where
the players share benets instead of costs (the LP models for these games remain the
same as in Section 2.1 by dening v(S) =  v^(S)).
3.1 Insurances
Lemaire (1991) presents several examples on how cooperative game theory can be used
in the context of insurance companies. The Example 3 on his article illustrate a problem
where dierent associations can collaborate by investing in common funds. The data and
results for this example are shown in Table 1.
The allocation x solves the rst LP of the sequence, but not the second one. This same
example was used in an earlier article (Lemaire, 1984), where the same author states that
in order to compute the nucleolus one has to solve a linear program which is equivalent to
P . A fact that is omitted by the author is that this model may have multiple solutions.
In the solution we obtain for the rst LP in the series, there are three coalitions with
the lowest excess "1 = 6562:5, but only two optimal dual values are positive (y1 and y6).
By dening F1 = f1; 6g and running the second LP, we obtain the solution x which is
the correct nucleolus for this game. Note from the excess vectors in non-decreasing order
shown in Table 1, the excess vector at x is lexicographically greater than the excess vector
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Table 1: Data, correct and wrong results for the game on insurances by Lemaire (1991)
Correct Wrong
c S v^(S) x c " x c "
1 f1g 46 125.0 52 687.5 1 6 562.5 52 687.5 1 6 562.5
2 f2g 17 437.5 24 468.8 6 6 562.5 24 937.5 3 6 562.5
3 f3g 5 812.5 12 843.8 2 7 031.3 12 375.0 6 6 562.5
4 f1,2g 69 187.5 3 7 031.3 2 7 500.0
5 f1,3g 53 812.5 4 7 968.8 4 8 437.5
6 f2,3g 30 750.0 5 11 718.8 5 11 250.0
7 f1,2,3g 90 000.0
at x, since their two rst components are equal but the third component of the former is
greater than the third component of the latter (7031:3 > 6562:5).
3.2 Joint projects
Krus and Bronisz (2000) consider a cooperative game where dierent agents are interested
in the implementation of a project. The authors outline an algorithm for calculating the
nucleolus (and other nucleoli variants). Although the algorithm is correct and the authors
acknowledge that the solution to a model in the sequence of LP may not have a unique
solution, how the dual values can be used in the the denition of the sets Fi is not detailed.
Instead, they refer the reader to Christensen et al. (1996), who correctly incorporates the
information on the dual values in the solution process.
The characteristic function of the example in Krus and Bronisz (2000) is shown in
the third column of Table 2. The rst and second columns of the table show an index
c 2 f1; : : : ; 2n   1g that we use to refer to each coalition and the players who conform
them, respectively. The next three columns show the correct nucleolus solution x we have
computed for this example, and the excess vector in non-decreasing order together with
the index of each coalition in this vector. The last three columns show the solution x
given by Krus and Bronisz (2000), and the corresponding excess vector.
The allocation x = (0:96; 0:26; 0:18; 0:49) is one of the multiple optimal solutions to
model P . The optimal objective value to this model is "1 = 0:18. For the allocation x,
the excess of four coalitions (3, 8, 12 and 14) equals "1. By dening F1 = f3; 8; 12; 14g,
constraints (7) and (8) conform a system of linear equations whose unique solution is x,
so there is no need to solve more LPs in the sequence.
The optimal solution we obtain for the dual problemD in this example is y3 = y12 = 0:5
and yc = 0 8c 2 K n f3; 12g. Then, we dene F1 = f3; 12g, which determines a unique
value for x3. By solving the corresponding second LP, we obtain "2 = 0:38667 and positive
optimal dual values for y11, y13 and y14. By xing the excess of these three coalitions to
"2 and using the eciency condition and the allocation for x3 previously obtained, the
unique allocation x = (0:75; 0:48; 0:18; 0:47) is found, which is the nucleolus of this game.
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Table 2: Data, correct and wrong results for the game on joint projects by Krus and
Bronisz (2000)
Correct Wrong
c S v^(S) x c " x c "
1 f1g 0.00 0.75 3 0.18 0.96 3 0.18
2 f2g 0.00 0.48 12 0.18 0.26 8 0.18
3 f3g 0.00 0.18 11 0.39 0.18 12 0.18
4 f4g 0.00 0.47 13 0.39 0.49 14 0.18
5 f1,2g 0.68 14 0.39 9 0.24
6 f1,3g 0.24 8 0.40 2 0.26
7 f1,4g 0.75 9 0.45 11 0.37
8 f2,3g 0.26 4 0.47 4 0.49
9 f2,4g 0.51 7 0.48 5 0.54
10 f3,4g 0.07 2 0.48 10 0.60
11 f1,2,3g 1.03 5 0.56 13 0.61
12 f1,2,4g 1.53 10 0.58 7 0.70
13 f1,3,4g 1.02 6 0.69 6 0.90
14 f2,3,4g 0.75 1 0.75 1 0.96
15 f1,2,3,4g 1.89
Note in Table 2, the rst and second lowest excesses are the same for both solutions x
and x, but the third lowest excess " = 0:39 at x is greater (and thus better regarding the
nucleolus notion of fairness) than the third lowest excess " = 0:18 at x.
3.3 Production and transportation planning
Sakawa et al. (2001) deal with a problem on production and transportation planning
based on a real case of a housing material manufacturer. The authors acknowledge the
usefulness of solving a sequence of linear programs for calculating the nucleolus, and also
mention that by examining the optimal solution of the dual problem one can identify
which constraints must hold with the equality when solving such LPs. However, there
is no explicit mention to what this examination consists on. They present data for a
5-player game, where each player represents one city or sale base in the network of the
manufacturer. The characteristic function of this game, as well as our solution x and their
solution x, are shown in Table 3.
In order to compute the nucleolus x, we solve the rst LP in the sequence and nd
a solution where ve coalitions are left with the lowest excess "1 = 0:034, but only three
optimal dual variables are positive (y16, y21 and y30). Then, by dening F1 = f16; 21; 30g
and running the second LP, the solution we obtain has two positive optimal dual variables
(y9 and y26). Fixing the excess of these two coalitions, together with the excess of the
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Table 3: Data, correct and wrong results for the game on transportation and production
planning by Sakawa et al. (2001)
Correct Wrong
c S v^(S) x c " x c "
1 f1g 0.060 0.165000 16 0.034 0.165239 9 0.034
2 f2g 0.168 0.320500 21 0.034 0.327849 30 0.034
3 f3g 0.030 0.084500 30 0.034 0.077235 25 0.034
4 f4g 0.249 0.374500 9 0.039 0.379218 21 0.034
5 f5g 0.000 0.055500 26 0.039 0.050459 16 0.034
6 f1,2g 0.378 25 0.042 20 0.038
7 f1,3g 0.144 28 0.042 29 0.038
8 f1,4g 0.408 15 0.044 26 0.044
9 f1,5g 0.182 29 0.046 15 0.044
10 f2,3g 0.337 20 0.050 14 0.045
11 f2,4g 0.538 27 0.053 3 0.047
12 f2,5g 0.279 3 0.055 27 0.048
13 f3,4g 0.383 5 0.056 28 0.049
14 f3,5g 0.083 18 0.056 5 0.050
15 f4,5g 0.386 14 0.057 18 0.059
16 f1,2,3g 0.536 10 0.068 10 0.068
17 f1,2,4g 0.747 22 0.074 13 0.073
18 f1,2,5g 0.485 13 0.076 19 0.076
19 f1,3,4g 0.546 19 0.078 23 0.077
20 f1,3,5g 0.255 23 0.082 22 0.078
21 f1,4,5g 0.561 24 0.083 24 0.090
22 f2,3,4g 0.706 12 0.097 7 0.098
23 f2,3,5g 0.379 1 0.105 12 0.099
24 f2,4,5g 0.668 7 0.106 1 0.105
25 f3,4,5g 0.473 6 0.108 6 0.115
26 f1,2,3,4g 0.906 17 0.113 17 0.125
27 f1,2,3,5g 0.573 4 0.126 4 0.130
28 f1,2,4,5g 0.874 8 0.132 8 0.136
29 f1,3,4,5g 0.634 2 0.153 2 0.160
30 f2,3,4,5g 0.801 11 0.157 11 0.169
31 f1,2,3,4,5g 1.000
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three previous coalitions and the eciency constraint, dene a system of equations whose
unique solution is the nucleolus x. Note that the excess vector at x is lexicographically
greater than the excess vector at x. While the absolute dierence between the components
of x and x appear to be small, their relative dierences amount up to 9.1%, which in our
view is signicant (specially since the allocations in this problem represent percentages
applied to a prot in the order of millions). Since the characteristic function of this game
is given with three decimal digits and the allocations with six decimal digits, one may
interpret that the dierences in x and x are merely due to numerical issues. However,
we discard this interpretation by an exhaustive exploration where we veried that small
perturbations of v(S) have relatively low eects in the nucleolus of the game.
3.4 Electricity markets
SatyaRamesh and Radhakrishna (2009) present a cooperative game to allocate the trans-
actional transmission losses in a problem on electricity markets. In their rst case study,
they use a dataset from the IEEE 14-bus test system. The characteristic function for this
system is shown in Table 4. The allocation x they report as the nucleolus is a solution to
Table 4: Data, correct and wrong results for the game on electricity by SatyaRamesh and
Radhakrishna (2009)
Correct Wrong
c S v^(S) x c " x c "
1 f1g 1.275 3.0893 3 1.3695 3.1764 3 1.3695
2 f2g 3.471 5.2853 4 1.3695 5.1981 4 1.3695
3 f3g 1.466 2.8355 1 1.8143 2.8355 2 1.7271
4 f1,2g 7.005 2 1.8143 1 1.9014
5 f1,3g 4.081 5 1.8437 5 1.9309
6 f2,3g 5.672 6 2.4488 6 2.3616
7 f1,2,3g 11.210
the rst LP in the sequence, but not for the second one. In the solution we obtain for the
rst LP, the dual variables with positive values are y3 and y4. By dening F1 = f3; 4g,
the value of x3 is xed and the second LP gives as solution the allocation x, which is the
correct nucleolus for this game.
3.5 Mobiles in broadcast transmission
Hasan et al. (2011) consider a game where the players represent mobiles which are in-
terested on receiving the same information from a base station. The information could
be, for example, the streaming transmission of a sport or cultural event. The cost for
broadcast transmission must be shared among the mobiles. Table 5 shows the data and
results for this game.
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Table 5: Data, correct and wrong results for the game on mobiles by Hasan et al. (2011)
Correct Wrong
c S v(S) x c " x c "
1 f1g 8 7.5 5 0 8 1 0
2 f2g 1 0.5 10 0 0 5 0
3 f3g 10 1.5 1 0.5 2 6 0
4 f4g 11 10.5 2 0.5 10 10 0
5 f1,2g 8 4 0.5 11 0
6 f1,3g 10 11 0.5 13 0
7 f1,4g 19 12 0.5 2 1
8 f2,3g 10 13 0.5 4 1
9 f2,4g 12 14 0.5 7 1
10 f3,4g 12 6 1 12 1
11 f1,2,3g 10 7 1 14 1
12 f1,2,4g 19 9 1 9 2
13 f1,3,4g 20 8 8 3 8
14 f2,3,4g 13 3 8.5 8 8
15 f1,2,3,4g 20
The allocation x is a solution to the rst LP in the series but not to the second one.
In the solution that we obtain for the rst LP, there are seven coalitions whose excess is
" = 0, but only two of the corresponding optimal dual values are positive (y5 and y10). By
dening F1 = f5; 10g and running the second LP, we obtain as solution the allocation x,
which denes a single allocation for all players and is the correct nucleolus for this game.
Note the excess vector at x is lexicographically greater than the excess vector at x, since
the rst two components of the vectors are equal but the third component of x is greater
than the third component of x.
3.6 Manufacturing
Oh and Shin (2012) address a cost sharing problem on joint network-centric manufactur-
ing. They compute the nucleolus for an example using the characteristic function given
in Table 6. Their solution x solves the rst LP in the sequence (we neglect the last digit
of the excess), but fails to solve the second one. In the solution we obtain for the rst LP,
y3 and y4 are the only dual variables with positive values. By dening F1 = f3; 4g and
solving the second LP, the optimal solution x is obtained, which is the correct nucleolus
for this game.
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Table 6: Data, correct and wrong results for the game on manufacturing by Oh and Shin
(2012)
Correct Wrong
c S v(S) x c " x c "
1 f1g 375 144 331 695.3 3 3 485.5 339 171.0 3 3 485.0
2 f2g 245 280 233 051.3 4 3 485.5 225 575.0 4 3 486.0
3 f3g 211 239 207 753.5 5 11 606.3 207 754.0 5 4 130.0
4 f1,2g 568 232 6 11 606.3 6 19 082.0
5 f1,3g 551 055 2 12 228.8 2 19 705.0
6 f2,3g 452 411 1 43 448.8 1 35 973.0
7 f1,2,3g 772 500
3.7 Computational aspects
We would like to conclude this section with some remarks on the computational imple-
mentation of the sequence of LPs. First of all, the explicit implementation of the dual
model is not needed as most optimization software can provide information on the dual
solution after the primal model has been solved. For example, in our computations we
used AMPL/CPLEX 12.6, which include a command called .dual for this purpose.
Second, some numerical issues may arise in the solution process. For example, when
xing the excesses "k according to the equality constraints (7), the precision settings
of the solver may aect the solution. Also, when identifying the dual variables with
positive values, one may include certain tolerance to numbers that dier from zero by an
insignicant amount (e.g. 10 9), in order to avoid a wrong denition of the sets Fi.
Third, as well as the primal, the dual model may have multiple solutions. This might
aect the sequence through one gets to the nucleolus, but not the nucleolus itself (recall
this is unique).
Recently, Puerto and Perea (2013) develop an approach to compute the nucleolus by
solving only one LP, though of much larger dimension than the LPs in the sequential
approach. They also point out the computation may be aected by numerical precision
issues and propose a procedure to avoid them. Comparing the two approaches dene a
possible avenue for future research.
4 Final remarks
We as readers and researchers can certainly tolerate the existence of errors in past liter-
ature. However, when we realized that several authors in several dierent contexts have
incurred in similar errors and obtained conclusions based on wrong results, we found
worthy to write this note in order to facilitate correctness in future works. Especially,
because of the growing interest that cooperative game solution concepts have captivated
in our eld recently. It is fair to mention that when elaborating this note, we also veried
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that several other authors have calculated the nucleolus correctly (e.g. Frisk et al. (2010);
Lozano (2012); Lozano et al. (2013)).
Granot and Granot (1992) and Skorin-Kapov and Skorin-Kapov (2005) assert that a
method for computing the nucleolus by solving a sequence of LPs was \implicitly sug-
gested" by Schmeidler (1969). Whether an explicit algorithm in Schmeidler's seminal
work would have prevented mistakes will remain unknown. We attempted to trace where
in the literature the errors originated. Although we do not have an answer for such ques-
tion, when preparing this note we found a number of fuzzy statements which might lead
to confusion. For example, Faigle et al. (2001) state that when solving the second LP in
the sequence one must x the rst lowest excess for \all coalitions that become tight at
" = "1". Would this be interpreted as all coalitions for which constraint (2) is satised
with equality at an optimal solution of P , it may lead to a wrong nucleolus. Another
example is the highly cited manuscript by Lemaire (1984) that we mentioned in Section
3.1. He states that in order to compute the nucleolus \one has to solve the linear pro-
gram", followed by a formulation which is equivalent to P . A mention to the possibility
of this LP having multiple solutions is omitted. Unfortunately, the LP in his Example
3 has multiple solutions and the author reports a wrong nucleolus. This manuscript is
curiously one of the rst hits in Google Scholar when searching for \game theory" and
\cost allocation". In his later article, Lemaire (1991) briey mentions that the nucleolus is
computed by solving a nite sequence of linear programs, without any additional speci-
cation on this sequence. However, he includes the same wrong example from the previous
manuscript. Lemaire cite an even earlier article by Hamlen et al. (1977), which presents a
single LP model (equivalent to P ) to compute the nucleolus for a 3-player game. Despite
the years gone by, these ambiguities appear to still induce errors in recent literature, as
SatyaRamesh and Radhakrishna (2009) and Hasan et al. (2011) cite Lemaire (1984) as
the basis for the allocation methods they use.
Finally, although our attention focused on the the nucleolus, several other similar nu-
cleoli variations have been given in the literature. For example, the same article by Krus
and Bronisz (2000) include the weak nucleolus, the concession nucleolus, the proportional
nucleolus and the disruption nucleolus. These last two are also used by Lemaire (1984),
who unfortunately also reports a wrong solution for the proportional nucleolus. A similar
algorithm as for the nucleolus is generally used in order to compute these variations, being
the main dierence the way in which the excess is dened. Therefore, we hope our note
will help to prevent errors not only in the computation of the nucleolus, but also in the
computation of all types of nucleoli.
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